When You Call My Name by Karmen MacKendrick
ON THE LOVE OF COMMENTARY 
57 
 
 
WHEN YOU CALL MY NAME 
 
Karmen MacKendrick 
 
 
 
 
At the opening of his sermon on Acts 9:8, “Paul rose from the ground 
and with open eyes he saw nothing,” Meister Eckhart tells us that the 
cited line has four meanings. 
  
First, when he rose up from the ground, with his eyes open 
he saw nothingness, and this nothingness was God. Indeed 
he  saw  God,  and  that  is  what  he  calls  a  nothingness. 
Second, when he rose up, he saw nothing but God. Third, 
in all things, he saw nothing but God. Fourth, when he saw 
God, he saw all things as nothingness.
1  
   
Anyone who has ever read Eckhart will be familiar with the 
dizziness that increases the more we consider these options  together. 
God seems to be all things and nothing, and every  thing is no thing, 
at least insofar as it is God —though not otherwise. God is no thing, 
and in being no thing is alone in being indistinct from each thing (all 
things are distinct from one another). This is what Paul’s conversion 
illuminates  for  him,  shows  him  when  his  eyes  are  opened:  the 
“nothing” of the vision beheld by closed eyes, yet a nothing that is 
everything,  now.  Much  of  the  sermon  that  follows  dwells  on  the 
nature of that illumination, of light and especially of the divine light 
of what we would call knowing, were knowing not so very strange in 
Eckhart’s thought—and were Paul’s knowing not, so importantly, a 
knowing of nothing, the illumination of—and by—what we cannot see, 
strangely indistinct from the dark. 
  But  after  these  considerations,  Eckhart  suddenly  turns  to 
commentary upon a text that he considers to be related, though the 
relation is not so immediately obvious. “In the Book of Love,” he 
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declares—we would say, in the Song of Songs— “the soul speaks the 
following  words:  ‘In  my  bed,  all  through  the  night,  I  sought  him 
whom my soul loves, and I found him not’” (3:1). Eckhart considers 
what it means to seek at night, when the light by which Paul saw 
nothing is hidden from the soul. And he goes on to provide exegesis 
of several more lines, all of it fascinating. I want to focus, though, on 
his further consideration of this line about nighttime seeking, and on 
his curious commentary on the name that the soul gives to the one 
she  loves.  More  specifically,  I  would  draw  our  attention  to  this 
passage:  
 
But she, why does she say: ‘he whom my soul loves?’ . . . 
she did not name her love. There are four reasons why she 
did not name him. The first reason is that God is nameless. 
Were she to give him a name, one would have to imagine 
[a content] to it. But since God is above all names, no one 
will be able to pronounce God.  
 
[God, Paul saw, is nothingness; how would we name what 
is nothing, above all things?] 
 
The  second  reason  why  she  did  not  name  him,  is  this: 
when the soul dissolves entirely by love into God, it knows 
about  nothing  any  longer  except  love.  It  believes  that 
everyone  knows him as itself does. It is surprised when 
someone knows still another thing rather than God alone.  
 
[There is, as Paul saw, nothing but God; how would we 
then  know  what  is  not  God?  How  would  we  name 
divergent things in their distinction from him?] 
 
The third reason is that it does not have enough time to 
name him. It cannot turn away long enough from love. It 
can pronounce no other word than love.  
 
[In all things, the soul says only love, a word that takes up 
all the time there is for speaking; as in all things, Paul saw 
only God, taking up all the space that there is for sight.] 
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The fourth reason is that [the soul] supposes perhaps that 
he  has  no  other  name  than  ‘love.’  Saying  ‘love,’  it 
pronounces at the same time all names. 
 
[And  Paul,  seeing  God,  sees  all  things—as  nothing.  No 
thing can be all things; no name can be the pronunciation 
of every name at once. Unless that thing is not a thing, that 
name not a proper name, after all. In this all and no names, 
the four meanings of the phrase are drawn together.] 
 
  We find here Eckhart’s typical structural precision: four ways of 
seeing line up with four senses of naming.  The no-thing of Paul’s 
vision lines up with the all-names of the soul’s saying. But Paul sees 
nothing—because his eyes are open, or opened. And the soul does not 
name  her  love—because  this  is  the  only  way  to  name  him  (I  use 
Eckhart’s pronouns here for convenience and to retain as best I can 
clarity  in  connection  to  his  text).  Eckhart  moves  from  his 
consideration of this un-name straight back into a reconsideration of 
light and knowing. Let us, however, digress from his sermon to dwell 
on the names for a bit. 
  To  make  that  dwelling  possible,  I  need  to  make  some  more 
general  observations  about  names,  and  especially  about  the 
strangeness of (the) divine name(s). I will hardly be saying anything 
new if I note that names—proper names, and not just nouns that name 
in the sense that we might ask,  “what is the name of that strange 
looking plant?”—occupy an odd position in language. I suspect that 
this  position  is  somewhat  archaic;  that  is,  that  names  continue  to 
perform some of the functions that the rest of language loses as it 
loses its tight connections to theology and becomes in various ways 
more  practical  and  productive,  even  in  literature.  This  is  a  move 
upon which Andrew Cowell remarks in At Play in the Tavern, where 
he notes that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries we begin to see “a 
new model of the essential nature and social function of literature, a 
model that posits not theosis but semiotic play and overproductivity – 
profit – as the central feature of literature.”
2 This shift takes language 
away from the pronounced theological focus of late ancient semiotics, 
in which the world is, and is filled with, the sign of its creator, from 
whom meaning comes, to whom meaning returns – a complex notion 
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rendered more so by the strange priority of call over designation, as 
the return must return the calling. That move has already occurred a 
few centuries before Eckhart begins to preach and to write, but it is 
worth remarking upon for the light it may shed on the strangeness of 
names.  
On the older model, meaning, and all our ways of speaking it, 
lead  (back)  to  God  —  a  notion  that  becomes  wonderfully 
disconcerting if we link it with theologies of a God beyond being. 
When Eckhart delivers his sermon early in the fourteenth century, he 
suggests that at least one feature of language, the name called out by 
the soul in the night, is not concerned to produce, not intended to 
finalize  and  move  on,  but  moves  archaically  toward  the 
undesignatable  God  beyond  being:  named  with  all  names  by  the 
“love” that there is no time to call out, and that is called out in all 
speaking. 
Some, and not just  the dogmatically  Christian, are suspicious 
about this God said beyond saying. In Sauf le nom, Jacques Derrida 
voices  his  suspicion  that  even  in  aphophatic  or  negative  theology, 
some  trace  of  a  god-being  lingers  —  that  it  is  not  quite  negative 
enough. But a name is not a being, and even Derrida is intrigued by 
the particular sign of the name itself as a trace, all that is left of God 
in apophasis after its language is emptied of everything that might 
hold still.
3 He wonders, not only of “God,” whether the name is even 
in  language,  and  what  that  could  mean.
4    Certainly the nameless 
name in Eckhart’s  sermon  seems  strangely  out  of  place  and  even 
strangely displacing — as if we could say nothing, put into words what 
we see in the dark. The name of the beloved is what we call out not 
to designate, but in place of designating. This name is a sign of the 
divine, we might say, but one that fails to provide us with a referent. 
Aren’t  we  then  running  the  risk  of  talking  about  nothing  in 
another sense, as if we were making small talk or reifying a fiction – 
ultimately admitting that to speak of God is nonsense? If we are, it is 
a  risk  worth  running,  as  it  is  one  that  thought  must  run  when  it 
stretches toward its own limits. As Denys Turner points out, “In the 
sense in which atheists . . . say God ‘does not exist,’ the atheist has 
merely arrived at the theological starting point,” the place, Turner 
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says, from which theologians such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, or 
Meister Eckhart begin.
5 In naming God, the soul  — or Paul, or the 
theologian — names nothing. Or, rather, it names no thing — at least 
in the sense of the name as designation. But, assuming the soul is not 
calling out nonsense, there must be other ways to think of names. 
So let us look again at that name of God. Nancy writes, “‘I am 
God’: it is perhaps impossible to avoid this answer, if the question 
‘what is God?’ presupposes that God is a Subject. And either it does 
presuppose that – or else it must take the extreme risk . . . of giving 
no meaning to the word ‘God’ and taking it as the pure proper name 
of an unknown.”
6 Let us suppose with him that this risk too is worth 
taking. Then we find that “‘God’ signifies: something other than a 
subject. It is another sort of thought.”
7 This is a start, at least. A name 
for what does not exist, not a subject, not an object, “God” must then 
occupy an improper place in any sentence. Yet this is the improper 
place  of  a  proper  name:  “What  is  a  proper  name?  Is  it  part  of 
language? This is not certain, or at least it is not certain that it is a 
part in the way a common noun is. It does not behave like a sign. 
Perhaps its nature is that of a Wink, of a gesture that invites or calls.”
8 
It  does  not  behave  like  a  sign  —  not  insofar  as  a  sign  is  that  which 
designates something. The wink is a distinct yet indirect invitation. It 
does not indicate, but invites — or invokes. Holy names are lacking, 
says the poet Friedrich Hölderlin; he links this lack to the inadequacy 
of our joy in the face of divine delightfulness.
9 Nancy plays on this 
notion:  “‘God’  is  that  common  noun  (that  metaphor, 
proper/improper by definition) that becomes a proper name only when 
it is addressed to that singular existent who lacks a name. It is thus 
                                                                                                 
5 Denys Turner, “How to be an Atheist,” in Faith Seeking (London: SCM 
Press, 2002), 3-22, at 8.  
6  Jean-Luc  Nancy,  “Of  Divine  Places,”  trans.  Michael  Holland,  in  The 
Inoperative  Community,  ed.  Peter  Connor  (Minneapolis:  University  of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 110-150, at 145. 
7 Nancy, “Of Divine Places,” 145: “But I cannot answer the question ‘what is 
a god?’ by saying I am he. ‘A god’ signifies: something other than a subject. It 
is  another  sort  of  thought,  which  can  no  longer  think  itself  identical  or 
consubstantial with the divine that it questions, or that questions it.” 
8 Nancy, “Of Divine Places,” 119. 
9  Friedrich Hölderlin,  “Heimkunft”  (“Homecoming”)  in  Selected  Poems  and 
Fragments, trans. Michael Hamburger (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 164-
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prayer, invocation, supplication or whatever – addressed to the lack 
of a name.”
10 God is the name that calls out to the lack of a name that 
would fix a designation (“she did not name her love”). It is properly 
an address, but an address deprived of a designated object becomes 
rather improper again. The name does not quite fit within language; 
it is language as it breaks with its own systematic structure.
11 
Not  precisely  a  proper  name,  the  divine  name  (whatever, 
however we call it) is perhaps a sort of improper name, a name that 
does  not  stay  within  the  constraints  of  propriety —of  clarity, 
singularity, or accepted use. In fact, says Nancy, “God’ – what we call 
‘God,’ and not the name Deus/Theos and all its metaphors – is is the 
very name for the impropriety of the name.”
12 We have no proper 
labels, no fixable meaning or singular sense, but even as we remain 
without possession, we call, and we respond to a calling to which our 
own return call is sometimes an answer. We have no thing, but we 
desire.  
  It is clear from Eckhart — clear, at any rate, in that distinctive 
Eckhartian  way  —  that  there  is  something  about  the  divine  that 
perfectly suits the improper name. Often edgy about naming God at 
all,  in  this  sermon  —  in  this  odd  digression  within  a  sermon,  a 
sermonized commentary on a line that has called to him beyond his 
ability to resist — Eckhart is willing to allow a strange kind of naming, 
a naming that is without names, or is all names, or is the quasi-name 
tossed out by one who cannot be distracted from love long enough to 
be bothered with naming as such. And it fits rather elegantly with a 
sense of divine name as a name that calls without designation, to such 
an extent that what the name “designates” is only calling, questioning, 
mystery in its seductive or drawing sense—a mystery not separated 
from intimacy, linking us to the premodern God of infinite distance 
who is nonetheless found in an inward turn. 
  This is not quite so bizarre a view of names as it might at first 
seem.  Proper  names,  in  their  odd  positioning,  generally  serve  two 
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functions much more strongly than do other nouns. The first, oddly 
enough, is designation. Most nouns designate generally; “cat” does 
not tell you which of the world’s many felines is intended. We can 
add articles or other indications—the cat, your cat—but even here we 
must sometimes recognize substitutability; you might in your life own 
many such animals. A proper name, though, seems to be as close as 
ordinary  language  gets  to  the  marvelous  “rigid  designator”  of 
possible-worlds  philosophy:  wherever  and  whenever  that  name  is 
used, it picks out just that entity.
13 Google has taught us, of course, 
that we have to qualify such a claim; when I search for an author 
with a common proper name,  for instance, I find that the designator 
picks out a great many people in whom I have no interest. When that 
happens, we try to make the proper name more proper — including a 
middle name, for example, to specify a person; or a state or country, 
to  specify  a  city.  But  insofar  as  any  word  or  phrase  picks  out  its 
signified with true precision, that word or phrase will be a proper 
name (or a definite description, but let us leave that point aside as 
not, I promise, quite relevant to our purposes).  
  The second function particularly pronounced in names is one 
that links them to that ancient and late ancient sense of language’s 
theological ground: they call. They are words we use when we want 
to draw something or someone toward us. Like theology, they reach 
toward, they draw, they exclaim. 
  To  then  hear  that  a  name  may  in  fact  be  a  kind  of  word 
characterized by its refusal (or failure) to designate must be strange 
indeed, and of course it is not true that all names, or all senses of 
naming, so refuse. Most names both designate and call; when we ask 
“what are you called?” — a query admittedly more idiomatic in many 
other languages than it is in English — we ask for a designator as 
much as for a means of summoning. Nor do we summon all named 
things; one does not try to entice a city to be closer, however much 
one  might wish to  be closer to that city. For a name to refuse to 
designate at all, or for it to designate only in a strange and apophatic 
manner,  it  must  not  be  the  name  of  a  being.  Beings  may  be 
designated, pointed out. And that, of course, narrows down our list of 
such names considerably.  
Why bother to name what is not? Obviously, we might use a 
name  in  error,  thinking  that  it  designates  some  existing  thing  or 
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person that does not, it turns out, in fact exist after all. But we would 
use such a name deliberately and correctly only if we were naming 
what is not simply inexistent any more than it is a being, and this, of 
course, puts us squarely back into classic apophasis, there at Turner’s 
starting point for theology. What I want to ask is a variation on the 
very old negative theological puzzles about divine names, but it is also 
a variant on Augustine’s musing in the Confessions, as he tries to work 
out what he loves when he loves his God. Augustine will go through 
his senses and declare God at once in excess of each and fully both 
enticing and satisfying: “Yet there is a light I love, and a food, and a 
kind of embrace when I love my God: a light, voice, odour, food, 
embrace . . . where my soul is floodlit by light which space cannot 
contain, where there is sound that time cannot seize, where there is a 
perfume which no breeze disperses, where there is a taste for food 
that no amount of eating can lessen, and where there is a bond of 
union that no satiety can part.”
14 Standard interpretation assures us 
that Augustine intends here to get beyond the sensual and into the 
love of a God of pure abstraction, through the superior “spiritual” 
senses.  I  would  argue  instead  that  he  is  intensifying  the  sensual 
beyond any possibility of reduction to either abstraction or matter. 
But whichever turns out to be true, we may also notice something a 
little bit odd: he talks about each sensory pleasure, but he doesn’t 
really  describe  some  being  that  gives  them  all,  only  the  pleasures 
themselves. What he loves is this infinite enticement, these pleasures 
that continue to call him long after an ordinary pleasure of the senses 
would have led to satiation. What then does he love when he loves 
his God? A sight, a sound, an embrace.  What then does the poet 
name, for Eckhart, when he names the love of his soul?  
  That  name  names  nothing,  designates  no  content;  the  soul 
names no thing, having no distinction from love by which to have a 
voice;  she cannot take the time  to name the love she is too busy 
experiencing, because there is no time outside the love itself, and even 
a  single  word  takes  time  for  the  speaking.  And,  perhaps  most 
interestingly of all, she need name no other name, because  “love” 
names with all names. Surely, however, all names cannot at the same 
time name nothing, unless by a very peculiar twist of logic. So it is 
not the case that all names are rendered indifferently the same here. 
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Love cannot name with all names if by that we simply mean to 
identify every existing object with love — and this despite the fact that 
it  is  sometimes  (not  always)  a  little  tricky  to  absolve  Eckhart  of 
pantheism. If “God” is “love,” then no given object is God. The name 
that is all names is not all-designating; indeed, there are no things 
picked out by its designation. But it is all-calling: that is what naming 
in love does.  
  Here  I  would  like  to  digress  with  a  promise  of  return.  Like 
Eckhart’s, my digression will at first seem deeply peculiar, and maybe 
not  only  at  first.  I  want  to  compare  Eckhart’s  name  that  calls  all 
names and yet has no time to be called to the names used in both 
essay  and  fiction  by  the  French  philosopher,  translator  and 
pornographer  Pierre  Klossowski.  In  both  fictive  and  philosophical 
work,  Klossowski  is  drawn  to  desire,  particularly  to  desires  of 
unusual intensity. Philosophically, he writes about Sade, for example, 
not  as  an  incomprehensibly  distant  figure  but  as  “my  neighbor;” 
about Nietzsche, not as the last metaphysician but as the thinker of 
recurrence as a consequence of the astonishing experience of pure 
affirmation. He acknowledges the influence of “Gnostic thinkers” — 
he seems to have the Carpocratians especially in mind — on his own 
thought and writing, and some of that influence seems to have to do 
with his valuations of desire. In his fiction we find a similarly strange 
sort of repetition and recurrence. Under the repetition of the same 
names, we find not the same subjects, appearing stably across time, 
but  the  same  intensities  of  desire,  which  re-emerge  as  the  stories 
almost repeat themselves, but not quite, and as we gradually realize 
that  the  same  name  is  not  calling  quite  the  same  character.
15  The 
exemplar in Klossowski’s fiction is probably the name of Roberte, 
who (or which) recurs in the trilogy The Law of Hospitality as a figure 
of desire, primarily masochistic desire, but not as the same person. A 
still more bewildering example occurs in The Baphomet, in which in 
which the very narrator’s name “registers repetitive embodiment.”
16 
As  Ian  James  writes,  “Klossowski’s  work  bears  witness  to  a 
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proliferation  of  names,  both  historical  and  fictional,  all  of  which 
become the object of repeated questioning or obsessive fascination.”
17  
These names, like “God” or “whom my soul loves,” name some 
sort of mystery, some perpetually fascinating unanswerable, infinitely 
replied-to query. James adds, “Throughout Klossowski’s oeuvre the 
proper name articulates a double and paradoxical movement; it both 
designates a figure with an apparent history, identity and coherence . 
. . yet at the very same time it marks the abolition or suspension of 
identity, history, and coherence.”
18 The name reembodies — not the 
subject, not even the I. Like the Nancyan proper name, the name for 
Klossoski is a very strange, and very inviting, sort of sign. It is as if, 
compelled by a sufficient force of desire, the name could become the 
very inverse of a rigid designator
19 – it does not point out at only one, 
but  beckons  toward  to  every  one.  But  it  does  not  summon 
indifferently,  nor  does  every  name  persistently  appear.  As  Mark 
Jordan writes, “The form of Klossowski’s work may not be obsession 
so much as anamnesis. His capacity for fixing desire on a singular 
sign,  on  a  name  above  all  other  names,  may  be  diagnosed  as 
monomania or fostered as liturgical citation.”
20 We might consider 
Klossowski’s  obsessiveness,  then,  not  as  pathology  but  as  that 
particular form of the linguistic that we call liturgical. The name is 
prayed: called out by the love of the soul. It is sought in the night in 
which those who love can see nothing. 
  Only  the  name  as  liturgical  citation,  the  divine  name  desired 
with all the desire in language, can name with all names. That is: only 
such a name can call out all names, all loves, all desires, the pleasures 
of all the senses. When names fail in designation, they may intensify 
in evocation: they keep calling. They call what cannot be designated 
because  it  does  not  belong  to  the  realm  of  knowledge;  cannot  be 
known, both because it is no thing and because we call in the dark, 
when there is nothing to be seen. They call in desire. The desires that 
call  by  these  recurring  names  share  the  peculiarity  of  being 
unfulfillable, or self-renewing. They do not work in the manner of the 
appetite for food, but in that of the Augustinian, and indeed more 
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widely premodern, appetite for God, in which desire is not consumed 
by its own satisfaction but rendered infinite in its very delight.  
The deeply strange, utterly beloved divine name is lacking, but 
it  lacks  nothing:  only  the  object  to  which  it  might  point,  only 
designation, and it designates nothing. In saying love, the soul names 
with all names: it calls out in perfect desire to every and no thing. In 
calling in the night, it knows nothing, and thus, like Paul, it knows 
God: it wants everything, it is everything it wants; it wants no thing, 
and  it  knows  nothing  at  all.  It  is  to  that  nameless  name  that  it 
reiterates its prayers, to that love that it calls out. 
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